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Perhaps more than most areas of cognitive psychology, the study of human judgment and
decision-making relies heavily on experimental tasks communicated through written descriptions
that convey numeric quantifiers as primary sources of information. Subjects in such studies
usually are required to use such information to make choices, indicate preferences, or offer
judgments. These responses are compared to normative benchmarks, resulting in the researchers
drawing conclusions about the quality, coherence, or rationality of human judgment and
decision-making (Arrow, 1982; Tversky and Kahneman, 1986; Stanovich and West, 2000).
Most of this body of research has paid little attention (a) to how subjects interpret numeric
information conveyed in writing and (b) to how those interpretations are influenced by
context (Mandel and Vartanian, 2011; Teigen, in press). More often than not, researchers
simply assume that subjects will interpret numeric quantities conveyed in experimental
tasks as exact values, and also that subjects should interpret expressed numbers as precise
quantities.
Yet it is uncontroversial in linguistics that numeric quantifiers may be treated as exact or
approximate values, and where their interpretations are approximate, they may be treated as one-
sided (e.g., at least, which is lower bounded, or at most, which is upper bounded) or two-sided
(e.g., roughly or about). Linguistic accounts of numeric quantifiers (e.g., Horn, 1989; Carston, 1998;
Levinson, 2000; Geurts, 2006; Breheny, 2008) do not support the normative claim (or assumption)
that a precise “bilateral” reading of such quantifiers consistent with exactly is the proper reading.
Although linguistic accounts differ in what they posit as possible semantic defaults, even those
proposing a bilateral semantics, such as Breheny (2008), specify pathways for pragmatically
derived unilateral interpretations, such as interpreting a numeric quantifier, x, as at least x or at
most x.
More generally, the degree to which decision researchers seem confident in defining the
meaning of linguistic terms for others runs counter to a fundamental idea in the philosophy
of language, which holds that the meanings of words are definable only through their
actual use in language (e.g., Wittgenstein, 1953; Austin, 1979). It also runs counter to
psycholinguistic evidence indicating that even 5-year olds understand that numeric quantifiers
should be interpreted as “at least” in some contexts (Musolino, 2004). And it runs counter
to work in experimental pragmatics indicating that people develop context-sensitive scalar
implicatures as they develop. For instance, they come to understand that although some
logically entails all, it usually pragmatically excludes all because it would be infelicitous to use
some if one meant all (Moxey and Sanford, 2000; Noveck, 2001; Noveck and Reboul, 2008).
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Studies of Option Framing as a Case in
Point
Consider the following influential test of the coherence of
decision-making:
Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual
Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative
programs to combat the disease have been proposed. Assume that
the exact scientific estimates of the consequences of the programs
are as follows:
[Positive Frame]
If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved.
If Program B is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that 600
people will be saved, and 2/3 probability that no people will be
saved.
[Negative Frame]
If Program C is adopted, 400 people will die. If Program D
is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that nobody will die, and 2/3
probability that 600 people will die.
According to Tversky and Kahneman (1981), options A and C
in the Asian disease problem (ADP) are extensionally equivalent
and likewise for options B and D. The former, moreover,
are regarded by virtually all researchers who have used or
commented on the problem as “certain” or “sure,” whereas the
latter are regarded as “uncertain” or “risky.” Coherent choices
thus require that a decision-maker who chooses A over B would
also choose C over D (or vice versa).
Yet Tversky and Kahneman (1981) and others (e.g., see
Levin et al., 1998, for an overview) found that most subjects
choose A in the first pair and D in the second, ostensibly
violating one of the most consensual normative principles of
choice (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986)—description invariance,
which states that extensionally equivalent events should not be
differentially regarded merely because of the way in which they
are described.
I say “ostensibly” because the claim that subjects presented
with this problem violate description invariance (and, hence, are
incoherent in their decision-making) rests on a shaky argument I
call proof by arithmetic, which goes like this:
1. There are exactly 600 people at risk.
2. Option A will save exactly 200 people.
3. Option C will let exactly 400 people die.
4. Option A implies that exactly 400 people will die because
exactly 600minus exactly 200 is equal to exactly 400.
5. Option C implies that exactly 200 people will be saved because
exactly 600minus exactly 400 is equal to exactly 200.
6. Therefore, option A is equal to option C.
A similar argument can be expressed for the claim that options B
and D are equivalent.
The reason the proof-by-arithmetic argument is shaky is that
it assumes people interpret numeric quantifiers as exact values,
when as noted earlier this reflects a naïve view on quantifiers, in
particular, and language, in general.
To put that view to a proper test requires asking subjects not
only about their choices but also about their interpretations of the
quantifiers in the options presented to them. This approach was
adopted in a recent experiment (Mandel, 2014, Experiment 3).
After presenting subjects with a choice problem much like the
ADP (except that it focused on 600 people at risk in a war-torn
region rather than 600 people at risk due to an unusual Asian
disease), they were asked whether they interpreted “200” in the
positive frame or “400” in the negative frame as meaning (a) “at
least [n],” (b) “exactly [n],” or (c) “at most [n].” Sixty-four percent
responded “at least,” 30% responded “exactly,” and the remaining
6% responded “at most.”
This finding shows how untenable the proof-by-arithmetic
argument is as a basis for the claim that subjects violate
description invariance in framing problems like the ADP. Simply
put, the researchers’ interpretation was not shared by most
subjects, who instead viewed the quantifiers presented to them
as lower bounds. That result has profound consequences for the
interpretation of subjects’ choice data. Take the modal response:
It is evident that saving at least 200 people [out of 600] is
objectively better than letting die at least 400 people [out of
600]. Rather than being a “preference reversal” of dubious
decision-making quality, for subjects who interpret the options
as such, the pattern of choosing A over B and D over C may
maximize subjective expected utility. In fact, when subjects’
interpretations of the quantifiers in both options (i.e., A and
B in the positive frame and C and D in the negative frame)
were taken into account, a majority (76%) chose the option that
was utility maximizing. Moreover, the framing effect reported by
Tversky and Kahneman (1981) was found only in the subsample
that reported a lower-bound interpretation of the quantifiers in
options A or C. For those subjects who interpreted the quantifiers
as exact values, there was no effect of frame.
Teigen and Nikolaisen (2009) also found evidence that
numeric quantifiers are often interpreted as lower bounds. In
one framing experiment that used a financial version of the ADP,
subjects were asked which of two financial forecasters would
be more accurate. Forecaster A predicted that NOK 250,000
(of 600,000) would be saved (in the positive frame) or that
NOK 350,000 (of 600,000) would be lost (in the negative frame).
Forecaster B predicted that NOK 150,000 (of 600,000) would be
saved (in the positive frame) or that NOK 450,000 (of 600,000)
would be lost (in the negative frame). In fact, NOK 200,000 was
saved (NOK 400,000 was lost). In other words, the experiment
was set up so that one forecaster overestimated the outcome and
the other underestimated it, but they did so by the same amount
(NOK 50,000). Supporting the hypothesis that people often
spontaneously adopt a lower-bound interpretation of numeric
quantifiers, the forecaster who overestimated the actual amount
was judged to bemore accurate. This was so regardless of whether
the outcome entailed saving money or losing it (thus ruling out
an alternative explanation based on desirability).
Contexts Matter
The preceding examples suffice to show that it is untenable
for decision researchers to assume that subjects interpret
numeric quantifiers as exact values. The next examples further
demonstrate how aspects of context can moderate those
interpretations. First, quantifier interpretations may be affected
by the degree to which decision options are explicated. Consider
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the so-called certain options in the ADP: in A, nothing is said
about the remaining 400 people; in C, nothing is said about
the remaining 200. In contrast, the so-called uncertain options
better (if not fully) resolve the uncertainty resulting from partial
explication. That is, in options B and D the explicit probabilities
add up to unity and for each possible outcome all 600 people
in the focal set are accounted for—either they are all saved or
else they all die. In this sense, the certain options seem less
certain than the uncertain options. Mandel (2014, Experiment 3)
resolved the uncertainty by filling in the missing information:
If Plan A is adopted, it is certain that 200 people will be saved
and 400 people will not be saved.
If Plan C is adopted, it is certain that 400 people will die and
200 people will not die.
The effect of explicating the missing information on subjects’
numeric quantifier interpretations was striking: only 24%
selected “at least [n],” whereas 59% selected “exactly [n].” The
remaining percentage of subjects who indicated “at most [n]”
also nearly tripled (6 vs. 17%). The direction of these context-
induced shifts is predictable: when all members of a focal set are
referenced, it is likely that the speaker intends for the quantifiers
to be exact. Thus, one might expect the bilateral interpretation to
be modal, as was found. Yet one might also expect a smaller shift
in favor of “at most,” which may reflect the reader’s appreciation
that the sum of the quantified subsets cannot exceed the value of
the total set.
Moreover, the effect of sentential context (via the
manipulation of explication) extends to choice: when both
of the paired options were fully explicated, there was no effect
of frame on subjects’ choices (also see Kühberger, 1995; Mandel,
2001; Tombu and Mandel, 2015). Evidently, the interpretation
of numeric quantifiers depends on aspects of sentential context,
such as the explication of complementary implicit numeric
quantifiers, and these context effects also affect subjects’ choices.
In this regard, the present discussion adds to a small literature
that has highlighted the importance of context on decision-
making (e.g., Wagenaar et al., 1988; Hilton, 1995; Goldstein and
Weber, 1997; Rettinger and Hastie, 2001; Mandel and Vartanian,
2011).
Numeric quantifier interpretations are also affected by
linguistic inferences that may be drawn from the broader
semantic context of the decision-making problem. For instance,
when a rationale for the values presented in the ADP was
provided to subjects—namely, that there were only 200 vaccines
for the disease that would be available—then a majority (71%)
interpreted “200” as an upper bound (“at most”) in the positive
frame, whereas a majority (64%) interpreted “400” as a lower
bound (“at least”) in the negative frame (this experiment is
reported in the General Discussion of Mandel, 2014). In contrast,
when the standard ADP was presented, 58 and 54% gave the “at
least” response in the positive and negative frames, respectively.
Once again, the direction of these interpretational shifts (both
as a function of frame and whether a rationale was provided
to subjects) is predictable, reflecting subjects’ awareness that
maximum quantities (i.e., having only 200 vaccines) set upper
bounds on positive expected outcomes. And, once again, there
is evidence that the effect of context on linguistic interpretation,
in turn, influences the choices people make. When the vaccine
rationale was provided in the ADP, no effect of frame on choice
was found (Jou et al., 1996).
Conclusion
William James wrote:
The great snare of the psychologist is the confusion of his own
standpoint with that of the mental fact about which he is making
his report. I shall hereafter call this the ‘psychologist’s fallacy’ par
excellence.” (1890/1950, p. 196, italics in original).
Decision researchers have perennially committed this fallacy by
projecting their understanding of decision-task structure and
meaning onto their subjects and then assessing the rationality
of their subjects’ judgments and choices as if their subjects
invariably shared their views.
Over the years, a minority of psychologists have objected to
that approach, having noted how subjects’ task construals often
differ from those assumed by experimenters (e.g., Henle, 1962;
Berkeley and Humphreys, 1982; Phillips, 1983; Hilton, 1995). For
instance, Gigerenzer (1996) stated:
Semantic inferences—how one infers the meaning of
polysemous terms such as probable from the content of a sentence
(or the broader context of communication) in practically no
time—are extraordinarily intelligent processes. They are not
reasoning fallacies.” (p. 593)
The research and arguments summarized here continue in a
similarly critical vein, extending the alternative-task-construal
argument to problems involving the linguistic interpretation
of numeric quantifiers. As the examples provided here have
illustrated, those linguistic interpretations are not only, at times,
modally different from experimenters’ interpretations, but also
predictably moderated by multiple aspects of context. Such
findings certainly do not prove that humans are rational, but they
do show that some influential claims about human irrationality
in decision-making are unwarranted. Such claims would benefit
from careful consideration of possible linguistic effects on
people’s judgments and decisions.
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